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Recent Legislation
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - EQUAL PROTECTION - PUPIL
PLACEMENT STATUTES
Ten states have recently enacted statutes regulating the place-
ment and assignment of pupils.' For the most part these statutes
were enacted as a result of the Supreme Court's decision in Brown
v. Board of Educ.,2 to meet the problems presented by that decision,
if not to circumvent its directive entirely.3
Generally, these statutes set out various criteria relating to
school facilities and the pupils themselves.4 The criteria are used
by local school authorities as a basis for placing and assigning pupils
within a local public school system. Most of these statutes also em-
power school officials to examine the individual pupil to determine
his qualifications by using the standards embodied in the placement
statute. Many of the standards, however, do not embody definitive
objective tests for such an analysis. Therefore, the local school offi-
cials have discretionary powers in making pupil-placement determi-
nations. As such, these statutes have the inherent infirmity of being
readily subject to abuse.
One of the criteria set forth in the subject Alabama statute,5 for
example, provides that school officials may consider "the psy-
chological qualification of the pupil for the type of teaching and as-
sociations involved." This provision dearly allows a wide latitude
of discretion by the local school officials. Its subjective nature pro-
vides a means by which segregation can be perpetuated. In addition,
many of these statutes can be used to perpetuate segregation by ap-
plying their standards only to certain groups, or by using frivolous
1. ALA. CODE REcOMP. tit. 52, § 61 (1958); ALA. CODE RECOMP. tit. 52, §5 1,
61(13) (Supp. 1963); ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 80-1519 to -1530 (Repl. 1957); FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 230.232 (1961); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 17.101 (1963); MISS. CODE
ANN. §5 6334-01 to -11 (Supp. 1962); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 115-176 to -179 (Repl.
1960); S.C. CODE ANN. tit. 21, § 230(9) (1962); TENN. CODE ANN. § 49-1742
(Supp. 1964); TEx. REV. CIVIL STAT. ANN. art. 2901a (Supp. 1964); VA. CODE
ANN. tit. 22 5 232.1 (1964).
2. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
3. Pupil placement and assignment statutes are criticized because they often give
school officials the authority to initially assign the pupils to specific schools and thereby
leave the Negro with the initiative of seeking admission to a "white school." See
Hartman, The United States Supreme Court and Desegregation, 23 MODERN L. REV.
353, 366 (1960).
4. For a complete list of the criteria see notes 32, 34 infra.
5. ALA. CODE RECOMP. tit 52, § 61(4) (1958).
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and arbitrary standards. As a result, several questions have arisen,
as to their constitutionality.' ..
This article will survey some of the more recent enactments, giv-
ing particular emphasis to a recently enacted Alabama, placement
statute. More specifically, these statutes will be treated in light of
the legal environment in which they were conceived, i.e., the four-
teenth amendment, the Supreme Court's decision in the segregation
cases,7 and the recent federal court decisions relating to pupil place-
ment laws.
Pupil Placement and Equal Protection.-The fourteenth amend-
ment prohibits any state from denying "to any person within its
jurisdiction, the equal protection of the laws."'  The language of
the amendment is clearly prohibitive in form in that it restrains the
states from engaging in, or lending support to, discriminatory prac-
tices. The fourteenth amendment has been used by the courts as
the basis for striking down discriminatory state action in many areas,
including education. Accordingly, in Brown v; Board of Educ..9 the
Supreme Court held that separation of pupils in public schools sole-
ly on the basis of- race or color is violative of the equal prot&tion
clause of the fourteenth amendment. The Court stated that the
"opportunity of an education ... where the state has undertaken
to provide it, is a right which must be made available to all on equal'
terms."'0  The rationale of the Court was that "to separate them,
[Negro pupils] from others of similar age and qualifications solely-
because of their race generates a feeling of inferiority as to.,their
status in the community that may affect their hearts and minds in
a way unlikely ever to be undone."" The rationale and holding of
6. Three statutes have been declared unconstitutional: the Virginia Act, Va. Acts Ex.
Segs. 1956, ch. 68, 70, because it provided no adequate remedy, Adkins v. School Bd.,
148 F. Supp. 430 (F.D. Va.), aff'd, 246 F.2d 325 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S.
855 (1957); the Florida Act, Fla. Laws 1959, ch. 59-428, §§ 1, 2 and Fla. Laws-2d Ex.
Sess. ch. 31380, § 1-6, because the requirement of racial segregation continued, Gib-
son v. Board of Pub. Instruction, 272 F.2d 763 (5th Cit. 1959); the Louisiana Act,
La. Acts 1st Ex. Sess. 1960, No. 26, § 1, and La. Acts 1954, No. 55, §5 1-4, because it
did not provide standards for the placement decisions of the school board, Orleans Parish
School Bd. v. Rush, 242 F.2d 156 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 354 U.S. 921 (1957). These
Acts have since been amended. See note I supra.
7. These consisted of class actions originating in Kansas, South Carolina, Virginia,
and Delaware which were consolidated into one case, Brown v. Board bf Educ., 347
U.S. 483 (1954).
8. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
9. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
10. Id. at 493.
11. Id. at 494.
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the Court in Brown 2 dearly indicate that its prohibition is confined
to segregation on the basis of race, rather than to all methods of
classification which might result in de facto segregation.
It was in this setting that the pupil placement laws had their
origin.'" Although the courts have held that pupil placement laws
are not inherently unconstitutional 4 and that the school authorities
have the inherent power to exercise discretion in assigning and plac-
ing pupils, 5 they have recognized that these laws could be used to
discriminate against Negroes. Accordingly, the federal courts have
placed restrictions on their form and operation. The first require-
ment is good faith. Under this requirement, any action by the state
such as the establishment of criteria for pupil placement and assign-
ment must comply with the good faith requirement set forth in the
second Brown case.' 6 There, the Supreme Court, recognizing that
its ruling would pose many problems in school administration, stated
that "school authorities have the primary responsibility for elucidat-
ing, assessing, and solving these problems; courts will have to con-
sider whether the action of school authorities constitutes good faith
implementation of the governing constitutional principles."'"
It is doubtful that the Court had pupil placement laws in mind
at the time of this decision. Nevertheless, the principle stated is ap-
plicable. It was on this basis that the Virginia Placement Act" was
held unconstitutional in Adkins v. School Bd."9 There it was found
that the act, when considered in context with other legislation and
the state policy against desegregation, provided no adequate remedy
to an aggrieved party.2" The school authorities' fixed policy and cer-
12. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
13. In keeping with the custom of segregation embedded in the tradition of the South,
a number of states adopted statutes with the apparent motive of circumventing, or at
least lessening the immediate impact of the directives of Brown v. Board of Educ., 347
U.S. 483 (1954). See note 1 supra.
14. Goss v. Board of Educ., 301 F.2d 164, 169 (6th Cir. 1962), rev'd, 373 U.S. 683
(1963).
15. Calhoun v. Board of Educ., 188 F. Supp. 401 (N.D. Ga. 1959).
16. 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
17. Id. at 299. (Emphasis added.)
18. Va. Acts Ex. Sess. 1956, ch. 70, §§ 1-2a, 3(1-8), 4-11. The statute has since
been amended by the repeal of Virginia's "massive resistance laws," and has been held
constitutional on its face. VA. CODE ANN. tit. 22, § 232.1 (1964). Beckett v. School
Bd., 185 F. Supp. 459 (E.D. Va. 1959), a/I'd sub nom. Farley v. Turner, 281 F.2d
131 (4th Cir. 1960).
19. 148 F. Supp. 430, 445 (E.D. Va.), a/fd, 246 F.2d 325 (4th Cir.), cert. denied,
355 U.S. 855 (1957).
20. Ibid. In Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ., 162 F. Supp. 372 (N.D. Ala.),
a/f'd per curiam, 358 U.S. 101 (1958), the district court distinguished the Alabama
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tain legislation 2' manifested the state's lack of good faith and non-
compliance with the directives of Brown.22 But although the deter-
mination of good faith in Adkins was not difficult under the circum-
stances, there appears to be no definitive judicial statement as to
what constitutes good faith implementation of the governing consti-
tutional principles. It seems that this determination is made on
an ad hoc basis in light of all the facts and circumstances of the
specific case. Nevertheless, the fact that this principle has such an
infirmity does not detract from its importance as a key factor in de-
termining the constitutionality of any state action.
A second requirement is thaf the criteria used for pupil place-
ment and assignment must be applied on an individual basis. Thus,
classification of pupils cannot be on the basis of racial traits.2 This
principle was applied in Stell v. Savannah-Chatham Bd. of Educ.,24
where, in a well reasoned opinion which sheds light on the meaning
of "equal protection of the laws" in this area, the Fifth Circuit Court
of Appeals criticized the classification of pupils on the basis of racial
traits as being discriminatory. The court found that such classifica-
tion deprived Negro pupils whose abilities were equal to those of
whites of the opportunity to proceed along with other pupils with-
out regard to race. The Stell decision, by emphasizing the impor-
tance of treating each pupil on an individual basis, giving each the
opportunity to improve his position commensurate with his ability,
provides a principle of primary significance in defining "equal pro-
tection of the laws."2 5
Placement Laws, ALA. CODE RECOMP.-tit. 52, § 61 (1958), from the Virginia Place-
ment Act, Va. Acts Ex. Sess. 1956, ch. 70, §§ 1-2a, 3(1-8), 4-11, on the basis that the
Alabama statures provide an adequate remedy to any aggrieved party and the statutes do
not prevent integration and therefore do not manifest lack of good faith as did the
Virginia Placement Act.
21. Virginia law required closing of any school that was integrated, and in addition
provided a plan for tuition grants to students who objected to integrated schools.
22. Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294 (1955); see Dove v. Parham, 176 F. Supp.
242, 248 (E.D. Ark. 1959).
23. Stell v. Savannah-Chatham Bd. of Educ., 333 F.2d 55 (5th Cir.), cert. denied sub
nom., Gibson v. Harris, 376 U.S. 908 (1964).
24. Ibid.
25. It should be noted that the Alabama statute provides that it is to be administered
on an individual basis; it thereby rejects the concept of classifying pupils on the basis of
racial traits. ALA. CODE RECOMP. tit. 52, § 61 (1958).
Additional restrictions imposed by the federal courts are that the criteria used in
placing and assigning pupils: (1) must not be arbitrary, see Carson v. Warlick, 238
F.2d 724 (4th Cir. 1956); and (2) must be applied to all individuals regardless of
race or color, see Calhoun v. Latimer, 321 F.2d 302 (5th Cir. 1963); Dillard v. School
Bd., 308 F.2d 920 (4th Cir. 1962).
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Validity of Criteria in Pupil Placement Statutes.-The federal
courts have utilized the foregoing principles as the bases for deter-
mining the validity of manyp of the criteria embodied in pupil place-
ment and assignment laws of the various states. For example, the
criterion of adaptability, i.e., the ability of a student to accept or
conform to a new and different educational environment, although
difficult to evaluate, has been held not to be frivolous, especially
when supported by the opinion of an educator.26 Intelligence,
achievement, and health have also been held to be legitimate reasons
for separating pupils, as long as each child is treated as an indi-
vidual regardless of race or color.27 However, the Supreme Court
has held that such factors as friction, disorder, violence, and eco-
nomic retaliation cannot be considered in carrying out pupil place-
ment as part of a plan for desegregation if such factors pertain
solely to race or color and are induced by actions of the state's offi-
cials.2" But requiring a student to attend a school nearest his home,
or assigning a student to a certain school because another is over-
crowded, have been held to be valid criteria where the school district
boundaries have not been altered so as to promote segregation." 9
Finally, in Calhoun v. Board of Educ.,.° the district court held that
factors such as psychological qualification, psychological effect upon
the'pupil, social and psychological relationships with other pupils
and teachers, ability to accept and conform to new and different
educational environment, morals, conduct, health, and personal
standards of the pupil "would be relevant and material in Pupil
Placement and there is no reason why they should be applied in a
discriminatory way. The fact that the language is general does
not mean that it can be made to encompass a test which would not
be valid." 1 - But the relevancy of the foregoing factors depends
upon the objective to be achieved by the educational system. As-
26. Thompson v. County School Bd., 166 F. Supp. 529, 534, 536 (E.D. Va. 1958).
The court also accepted the validity of the following criteria: attendance area, over-
crowding, academic accomplishment, and psychological problems.
27. These criteria were specifically enumerated by the court as being valid factors to
onsider in assigning pupils. Borders v. Rippy, 247 F.2d 268, 271 (5th Cir. 1957).
28. Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958). Whether these factors could be considered
if not induced by actions of the state's officials, or whether they are valid when based
upon the personal traits of a pupil regardless of race or color, are considerations open to
question. See also Calhoun v. Board of Educ., 188 F. Supp. 401, 408 (N.D. Ga. 1959).
29. Thompson v. County School Bd., 166 F. Supp. 529, 536 (E.D. Va. 1958); see
also Lynch v..Kenston School Dist. Bd. of Educ., 229 F. Supp. 740 (N.D. Ohio 1964).
30. 188 F. Supp. 401, 409 (N.D. Ga. 1959); see also Carson v. Warlick, 238 F.2d
724 (4th Cir. 1956).
31. Calhoun v. Board of Educ., supra note 30, at 409.
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suming that this objective is to provide the means whereby each
pupil can develop his potential to the fullest extent possible, it be-
comes obvious that the foregoing factors would be relevant. They
promote the operation of an effective educational system which
meets the requirements of the individual pupil by grouping
only those pupils of similar ability, personality, and social back-
ground, thereby recognizing that culturally deprived pupils and
others similarly situated are in need of special care.
The Alabama Statutes.--In 1955, the Alabama legislature en-
acted its basic statute regarding the placement and assignment of
pupils in the public school system.82 This statute was amended in
1957," and additional statutes were enacted in 1963. 4 These stat-
32. ALA. CODE REcOMP. tit. 52, § 61(4) (1958). The statute provides, inter alia,
that:
In the assignment, transfer or continuance of pupils among and within the
schools, or within the classroom and other facilities thereof, the following
factors and the effect or results thereof shall be considered, with respect to
the individual pupil, as well as other relevant matters: Available room and
teaching capacity in the various schools; the availability of transportation fa-
cilities; the effect of the admission of new pupils upon established or pro-
posed academic programs; the suitability of established curricula for particular
pupils; the adequacy of the pupil's academic preparation for admission to a
particular school or facility thereof; the effect of admission upon prevailing
ligence or mental energy or ability of the pupil; the psychological qualifica-
tion of the pupil for the type of teaching and associations involved; the effect
of admission of the pupil upon the academic progress of other students in a
particular school of facility thereof; the effect of admission upon prevailing
academic standards at'a particular school; the psychological effect upon the
pupil of attendance at a particular school; the possibility or threat of friction
or disorder among pupils or others; the possibility of breaches of the peace
or.ill will or economic retaliation within the community; the home environ-
ment of the pupil; the maintenance or severance of established social and
psychological relationships with other pupils and with teachers; the choice
and interests of the pupil; the morals, conduct, health and personal standards
of the pupil; the request or consent of parents or guardians and the reasons
assigned therefor.
The act .from which this statute is derived contains a severability provision which is
given full scope and effect in Alabama. Ala. Acts 1957, No. 367, at 482. The Alabama
legislature also passed statutes which provide for closing schools, and which prohibit
the commingling of a pupil of one race with those of another against the pupil's will:
ALA. CODE ANN. tit. 52, 5§ 61(8), (13)-(19) (1960).
33. ALA. CODE RECOMP. tit. 52, 5 61 (1958).
34. ALA. CODE REcOMP. tit. 52, §5 1(8)-(11) (Supp. 1963). This statute includes
the following criteria for pupil placement and assignment: pupils who create disciplin-
ary problems and whose presence in the class may be detrimental to the best interest
and welfare of other pupils; and for the purpose of preventing or minimizing disciplin-
ary problems, the local school authorities may consider the pupil's social attitudes;
amenability to discipline; hostility toward the school environment; health, morals, clean-
liness, and habits of personal behavior. In addition, the local school authorities may
prescribe special courses in citizenship, health, morals, or any other subject necessary
to meet needs of special groups of pupils, and may assign special teachers and special
classrooms or other places for such purposes. The act from which this statute is derived
also contains a severability provision. Ala. Acts 1963, Nos. 460, 522, at 995, 1126.
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utes, in addition to setting out the criteria to be used in placing
and assigning pupils, empower local school boards to use the enu-
merated criteria for that purpose.35
The basic Alabama statute " was held constitutional on its face
in Shitlesworth v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ."7  There, four Negro
pupils brought a class action to test the constitutionality of the
statute and enjoin the school officials from enforcing it. The three
judge district court held that "the School Placement Law furnishes
the legal machinery for an orderly administration of the public
schools in a constitutional manner by the admission of qualified
pupils upon a basis of individual merit without regard to race or
color. We must presume it will be so administered. If not, in
some future proceeding it is possible that it may be declared unconsti-
tutional in its application."3
The 1963 Alabama pupil placement and assignment statutes
have not, however, been tested in the federal courts.39 Among other
factors, these statutes authorize the local school boards to take
into account pupil disciplinary problems, pupil morals and health,
and the interest and welfare of other pupils in the placing and as-
signing of pupils.4" These criteria are similar to those originally
enacted by the Alabama legislature in 1955, and thus it would seem
that they, like the others, would be found constitutional. But
considering the federal court decisions relating to similar criteria
embodied in other placement laws, two factors contained in the
Alabama statutes may be invalid: (1) the possibility of threat of
35. A careful analysis of the Alabama statute will indicate a great similarity between
the criteria contained therein and those contained in the statutes mentioned. It is ap-
parent from this similarity that many of the states which have enacted pupil placement
laws subsequent to their adoption by Alabama have emulated the Alabama statute.
Compare AiLA. CODE REcOMP. tit. 52, § 61 (1958), with FLA. STAT. ANN. § 230.232
(1961), and MIss. CODE ANN. §§ 6334-01 to -11 (Supp. 1962), and TENN. CODE
ANN. § 49-1742 (1964), and TEx. REV. CIVIL STAT. ANN. art. 2901a (Supp. 1964).
36. See note 32 supra.
37. 162 F. Supp. 372 (N.D. Ala.), affd per curiam, 358 U.S. 101 (1958). The
Supreme Court affirmed upon the limited grounds on which the court below rested its
decision. This narrow affirmance of the district court's decision reflects the Supreme
Court's uneasiness in affirming the constitutionality of Alabama's statute. Nevertheless,
this appears to be the only case to date relating to pupil placement laws that the Supreme
Court has heard.
38. Id. at 384. Here, the plaintiffs had specifically objected to the constitutionality
of particular tests embodied in the statute, but the court did not rule on the validity of
these tests since no evidence was presented to show that the Negro pupils were excluded
on the basis of the objectionable tests, rather than on the basis of the-admittedly valid
criteria. The court also rejected the proposition that the Alabama statute lacked good
faith as did the Virginia Placement Act, see note 18 supra.
39. See note 34 supra.
40. Ibid.
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friction or disorder among pupils or others; and (2) the possibility
of breaches of the peace, ill will, or economic retaliation within
the community.4 The Supreme Court's decision in Cooper v.
Aaron,42 casts doubt upon the validity of these factors. There, the
Court refused to delay integration even though the possibility of
disorder, violence, and economic retaliation was imminent. It
should be noted, however, that these factors would not invalidate the
entire statute due to its severability clause.4"
Although a pupil placement statute may be found constitutional
on its face, it may still be subject to attack on the grounds that it is
unconstitutional as administered or applied. This is particularly im-
portant in light of the fact that many of the criteria embodied in
the statutes are so intangible and nebulous as to leave wide discre-
tion with the school officials in applying the statutes. Thus, the
statutes may easily become the subjects of severe abuse and provide
a basis for discriminatory practices.44 However, it is clear that many
of the criteria in the Alabama statute are germane to an enlightened
educational system in that they recognize the special needs of indi-
vidual pupils and promote an efficient and effective educational
system. But as desirable as these results may be, they are over-
shadowed by the past actions and attitudes of many states
which have enacted placement laws.45 Regardless of the reason
for their adoption, the placement laws can serve a useful purpose if
properly administered. As observed by one court,6 the termination
of segregation based on race or color in the public schools is a social
41. AL. CoDE REcOmP. tit. 52, § 61(4) (1958).
42. 358 U.S. 1 (1958). This ruling may be limited to the specific 'fact situation
where the state authorities encourage disorder. See also Watson v. City of Memphis,
373 U.S. 526 (1963), where the Court ruled that constitutional rights may not be
denied because of hostility to their assertion or exercise. Accord, Bordets v. Rippy,
247 F.2d 268 (5th Cir. 1957).
43. See note 32 supra.
44. Among the criteria having this infirmity are: the psychological qualifications of
the pupil for the type of teaching and association involved; the psychological effect upon
the pupil of attendance at a particular school; the maintenance or severance of estab-
lished social and psychological relationships with other pupils and with teachers. See
note 32 supra; Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ., 162 F. Supp. 372, 383 (N.D.
Ala.), aft'd per curiam, 358 U.S. 101 (1958).
45. The past actions of Alabama have led one author to state that:
There is little doubt that the Alabama pupil placement law is being used
to carry on a pattern of strict segregation. It must be expected, however, that
the day will come when the continued systematic exdusion of Negroes from
Alabama "white" schools will make inevitable a holding by the federal courts
that the pupil placement law is administered in a discriminatory way. Hart-
man, supra note 3, at 368.
46. Thompson v. County School Bd., 166 F. Supp. 529, 535 (E.D. Va. 1958).
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epoch ending a custom which prevailed in the South for many
years. Adapting to its demands means overhauling the existing
educational system. The enactment of pupil placement laws is a
result of this overhauling and they are not discriminatory merely
because they are adopted in an environment of social change.
It appears that regardless of the motives which prompted their
adoption,4" pupil placement laws which do not lack good faith are
constitutional on their face; however, they may prove to be uncon-
situtional in application and administration. It is unlikely that the
Supreme Court will strike down these statutes by holding that segre-
gation in public schools, regardless of the basis, is violative of the
fourteenth amendment. The fourteenth amendment does not com-
mand the federal courts to take the initiative by setting forth a com-
mand of integration;48 rather, it is couched in prohibitive terms di-
rected to discriminatory state action. The function of the courts un-
der the fourteenth amendment, therefore, would seem to be that of
overseer, not activator."
PHILLIP J. CAMPANELLA
47. See Daniel v. Family Sec. Life Ins. Co., 336 U.S. 220 (1949); Doyle v. Con-
tinental Ins. Co., 94 U.S. 535 (1876) (ruling that the courts will not examine motives
of a state where the state has the power to act).
48. See Bell v. School City, 213 F. Supp. 819 (N.D. Ind.), aff'd, 324 F.2d 209 (7th
Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 924 (1964); Lynch v. Kenston School Dist. Bd. of
Educ., 229 F. Supp. 740 (N.D. Ohio 1964); cf. Blocker v. Board of Educ., 226 F.
Supp. 208, 230 (E.D.N.Y. 1964).
49. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals recently expressed the view that "a Negro is
entitled to the equal protection of the laws, no less and no more. He stands equal
before the law, and is viewed by the law as a person, not as a Negro." Collins v.
Walker, 329 F.2d 100, 105 (5th Cir. 1964).
It has been suggested that racial integration finds support in the spirit of the Con-
stitution and moral right. Perhaps this contention has merit, but forced association as
a means of achieving equal treatment may be distasteful to even the most liberal egali-
tarian. Moreover, the action might prove unnecessary in light of the recent progress
made by the Negroes in their drive for equal treatment, i.e., the advance made may
well be a heralding of the eventual assimilation of the Negro into society as was ac-
complished by ethnic minority groups.
[VoL 16:800
